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INTRODUCTION 
Technology transfer occurs when the owner of a technology 
grants access to that technology to another party.1 Today, compa-
nies consider technologies—as opposed to physical assets—the 
most important business assets that are directly tied to their prod-
ucts’ competitiveness.2 Intellectual property (“IP”) law protects 
those technologies. 
One type of technology transfer is contract manufacturing, 
where foreign companies employ Chinese companies to manufac-
ture products for the Chinese markets.3 Contract manufacturing is 
beneficial to foreign companies because it saves them shipping 
costs and time.4 To facilitate contract manufacturing in China, 
however, foreign companies—often the owners of the technolo-
gies—must authorize Chinese companies access to their proprie-
tary technologies.5 Another type of technology transfer—foreign 
direct investment (“FDI”)—involves foreign companies setting up 
business entities in China, either as joint venture partners with 
Chinese companies or as wholly-owned subsidiaries.6 Under FDI, 
foreign companies maintain a lasting ownership and control over 
their proprietary technologies.7 For FDI to operate successfully, 
foreign companies must transfer their proprietary technologies to 
their business entities in China.8 
In 2002, China implemented a provision in the People’s Re-
public of China (“PRC”) Regulations on Administration of Tech-
nology Import and Export (“2002 Technology Regulations”),9 
                                                                                                                            
1 See Daniel C.K. Chow, A Comparison of EU and China Competition Laws That Apply 
to Technology Transfer Agreements, 9 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 497, 497 (2014). 
2 See id. at 500. 
3 See id. at 501. 
4 See id. 
5 See id. 
6 See id. at 502. 
7 See id. 
8 See id. 
9  Regulations on Administration of Import and Export of Technologies (promulgated 
by the St. Council, Dec. 10, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002), CLI.2.38107(EN) 
(Lawinfochina), art. 27 [hereinafter 2002 Technology Regulations]. 
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mandating that licensees10 own the improvements they make to 
proprietary technologies to which the licensees receive authorized 
access11 (hereinafter referred to as the “prohibition on grant-back 
clauses”). Often, foreign licensors include grant-back clauses in 
their licensing agreements, providing that the foreign licensors own 
any improvements to the technology made by the Chinese licen-
sees. Notably, however, the 2002 Technology Regulations prohibit 
such grant-back clauses imposed by foreign licensors.12 
China’s grant-back regime is outdated and should be updated 
with the following proposed policy changes: China should 
(1) continue to prohibit grant-back clauses on severable improve-
ments, which can be used without using the original licensed pa-
tent; (2) make grant-back clauses on non-severable improvements 
non-mandatory, and subject potential abuse of non-mandatory 
grant-back clauses to the rule of reason under antitrust law; 
(3) apply its grant-back rule to domestic and foreign companies 
equally and fairly; and (4) reform its grant-back regime now, rather 
than later. 
Prior to reaching these solutions, this Note first discusses how 
China’s prohibition on grant-back clauses affects its technology 
transfer, with an emphasis on empirical data. Then, this Note ex-
amines China’s current grant-back regulations and compares them 
with China’s regulatory regimes in other related areas, as well as 
grant-back regimes in the United States and the European Union. 
                                                                                                                            
10 A licensee is one to whom a license is granted. Licensee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014). In this Note, a licensee refers to the party to which access to a technology 
is granted. 
11 See Chow, supra note 1, at 518–19. 
12 See id. at 519; 2002 Technology Regulations, supra note 9. 
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I. EMPIRICAL DATA: HOW THE CURRENT GRANT-BACK 
REGIME AFFECTS TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AGREEMENTS 
IN CHINA 
A. Statistics 
1. IP Licensing in China Is Growing Fast 
Table I below shows that the number of patent licensing con-
tracts increased drastically from 2005 to 2009. This data is ex-
tracted from the Patent Licensing Contract Record, which was im-
plemented by the State Intellectual Property Office of the People’s 
Republic of China (“SIPO”) in 2002.13 Although a patent license 
agreement would nonetheless remain valid without recordation, it 
is the best practice for a foreign company to record its patent li-
cense agreement in China in order to remit royalties overseas.14 
Therefore, this data is the best available to reflect the level of pa-
tent licensing activities in China.15 
 
Table I. Patent Licensing Contracts16 
 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Number of 
Contracts 274 113 n/a 187 8,350 12,403 
 
According to the International Licensing Industry Merchandis-
ers’ Association, the Chinese licensing market grew from $1.1 bil-
                                                                                                                            
13 See Toshiya Watanabe, Recent Increase in Patent Licensing in China and Its Effect on 
South–South Technology Transfer, TECH MONITOR, May–June 2011, at 31, 32  
http://www.techmonitor.net/tm/images/4/4c/11may_jun_sf3.pdf [http://perma.cc/
8MEZ-K29Y]. 
14 See Licensing and Technology Transfer, CHINA IPR SME HELPDESK, 
http://www.china-iprhelpdesk.eu/content/licensing-and-technology-transfer 
[https://perma.cc/K89R-XKV6] (last visited Mar. 13, 2016). 
15 See Watanabe, supra note 13, at 32. 
16 Paik Saber, Assistant Gen. Counsel, IBM Asia Pacific, Patent Litigation and 
Licensing in China (Few Practical Considerations) (Mar. 10, 2011) (on file with author). 
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lion in 2005 to $3.9 billion by 2010, representing a 25% year-over-
year growth.17 
2. China Is Currently “Under-Licensed” in Technology 
Transfer with the United States 
Graphs I and II below show licensing revenues from 2006 to 
2012, based on U.S. census data.18 The blue line in Graph I shows 
that, in 2012, the United States received a little less than $5 billion 
from China. Although China has seen an upward trend in licensing 
receipts, as the red line shows (about $500 million in 2012), the 
number of China’s licensing receipts was much less than that of the 
United States. 
However, this data might deviate from the actual licensing rev-
enues given the different pricing methods that companies adopt 
when recording licensing revenues with the U.S. Census Bureau. 
Thus, the comparison of the same data for Japan and the United 
States in Graph II might be more meaningful than the stand-alone 
data in Graph I. In 2012, Japan almost balanced the imports and 
exports in technology transfer with the United States.19 Assuming 
the same behavior by the United States in importing technologies 
from both China and Japan, the comparison of Graphs I and II sug-
gests that China is “under-licensed” with the United States.20 
Such under-licensing is especially striking considering the large 
trade deficit the United States has with China.21 As a result, Chi-
na’s under-licensed status indicates that Chinese technology ex-
port is an area with high economic growth potential.22 
 
                                                                                                                            
17 See Hao Zhan, SAIC Moves Closer to Antitrust Rules for Intellectual Property, INT’L L. 
OFF. (July 31, 2014), http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=
f8cbb0d5-6d93-4b19-b972-5a06cc0c92d1 [http://perma.cc/E5KT-2SDF]. 
18 See Mark Cohen, Special Counsel, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Licensing 
Impediments: Key Considerations for China-U.S. Technology Transfer (Jan. 7, 2015) (on 
file with author). 
19 See id. 
20 See id. 
21 The U.S. trade deficit with China was $365.7 billion in 2015, which is a new record. 
U.S. China Trade Deficit: Causes, Effects and Solution, ABOUT.COM, http://useconomy.about
.com/od/tradepolicy/p/us-china-trade.htm [http://perma.cc/6DUS-JBED] (last visited 
Mar. 13, 2016). 
22 See infra Section I.A.4. 
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Graph I. Licensing Revenues: China and the United States23 
 
Graph II. Licensing Revenues: Japan and the United States24 
3. Almost All Licensing Activities in China Involve Foreign 
Companies 
As of 2010, out of a total of 18,348 patent license transfers rec-
orded in the Patent Licensing Contract Record, only 33 (0.17%) 
                                                                                                                            
23 See Cohen, supra note 18. 
24 Id. 
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transfer technologies from Chinese companies to other Chinese 
companies, as opposed to foreign companies.25 
4. China Strives to Transform from a Technology Import 
Economy to a Technology Export Economy 
China is traditionally a major technology import country; in 
2014, with inflows at an estimated $128 billion, China became the 
world’s largest recipient of FDI.26 Significantly, as the global FDI 
declined by 8% to an estimated $1.26 trillion, inflows to China nev-
ertheless rose by about 3% in 2014.27 
The Chinese government has taken numerous steps to encour-
age both Chinese and foreign companies to possess legal ownership 
of original technologies.28 In 2008, the Chinese government re-
quired high-tech companies to possess a patent or receive the ex-
clusive patent license in order to receive grant money and tax ex-
emptions.29 On a global level, China is expected to transfer more 
technology in the future to facilitate the growth of Least Developed 
Countries (“LDC”).30 For example, in 2006, Chinese government 
supported the launch of the South–South Global Assets and Tech-
nology Exchange, which provides service to support technology 
transfer to LDCs.31 Other previous technology exports from China 
to developing countries include China’s Kpatawee Rice Project in 
Liberia in 1993 and technology transfer to boost food production in 
the China–Africa Cooperation Framework in 2007.32 
5. Economic Data on IP Licensing Is Scarce 
The Chinese government has not released any specific data on 
the grant-back regime specifically, making it difficult to directly 
                                                                                                                            
25 See Watanabe, supra note 13, at 35. 
26 See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Global FDI Flows Declined in 
2014: China Becomes the World’s Top FDI Recipient 2 (Jan. 29, 2015), 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaeia2015d1_en.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/VL9H-H99N]. 
27 See id. at 1–2. 
28 Watanabe, supra note 13, at 35. 
29 Id. 
30 See id. at 31. 
31 See id. 
32 See id. at 35. 
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study how China’s current grant-back regime affects China in an 
economic sense. In contrast, many economic analyses have re-
vealed that grant-back clauses are sometimes pro-competitive and 
sometimes anti-competitive.33 Therefore, the absence of economic 
data on China’s grant-back regime suggests that this issue is worth 
further exploring and has room for reform. 
B. High-Profile Deal: High-Speed Rail 
Since China first entered into the high-speed rail (“HSR”) 
market in 2003, China has progressed from a HSR novice to the 
host of the world’s largest high-speed network.34 Indeed, China’s 
HSR network spans more than 7,450 miles, far ahead of its nearest 
competitor, Spain, whose HSR network measures 1,925 miles.35 
Through technology transfer and reverse-engineering, China was 
able to become “the world’s high-speed hot spot” in a little over a 
decade.36 China required foreign companies that entered into the 
Chinese HSR market early to transfer their technology to their 
Chinese partners.37 For example, in 2004, Kawasaki Heavy Indus-
tries (a Japanese company) transferred HSR technology to China 
South Locomotive & Rolling Stock Corporation Limited (“CSR”) 
in a deal worth $740 million at the time.38 Also, in 2005, Siemens, a 
German company, transferred its HSR technology to China CNR 
Corporation Limited.39 Almost a decade later, the tables have 
turned: today, CSR is exporting its own HSR technology, and CNR 
is competing with Siemens for international contracts.40 
Indeed, China’s state-guided industry quickly took the tech-
nology, improved it to create domestic designs, and then re-entered 
the international market to meaningfully compete for lucrative 
                                                                                                                            
33 See infra Section III.B.1. 
34 See Chris Lo, China’s Fast Track to High-Speed Rail Exports, RAILWAY TECH. (Oct. 
13, 2014), http://www.railway-technology.com/features/featurechinas-fast-track-to-high
-speed-rail-exports-4401625/ [https://perma.cc/2LR2-GGFR]. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 See id. 
38 See Mukul Raheja, The Phenomenon of “Technology Transfer”: Lessons from China, 
SCI. TECH. & SECURITY F. (May 17, 2014), http://stsfor.org/content/phenomenon-
technology-transfer-lessons-china [http://perma.cc/L7Y5-T62A]. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. 
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deals.41 In 2005, the China Railway Construction Corporation and 
China National Machinery Import and Export Corporation won 
the contract to build an HSR line in Turkey.42 This HSR line, inau-
gurated in 2014, spans 330 miles between Istanbul and Ankara in 
three and a half hours at speeds up to 155 miles per hour.43 Tur-
key’s Ankara–Istanbul line is just one of several Chinese HSR 
projects, as Chinese companies have signed or are negotiating HSR 
contracts in several other countries, including Saudi Arabia, Hun-
gary, and Serbia.44 
In the past, most foreign companies willingly complied with 
China’s restrictive technology transfer regulations to gain access to 
the country’s massive population of consumers with disposable 
income.45 The president of Bombardier China (a Canadian aero-
space and transportation company) said in 2009, “Whatever tech-
nology Bombardier has, whatever the China market needs, there is 
no need to ask.”46 Still, despite the benefit of the Chinese market, 
grievances over intellectual property matters from these foreign 
companies have emerged.47 Kawasaki has publicly complained that 
CSR’s HSR technology is based on Kawasaki’s design and has 
threatened to sue CSR if it exports that design.48 Similarly, in 2010, 
executives from Siemens complained directly to the then-Premier 
Wen Jiabao about the rules that compel foreign companies to trans-
fer their technologies to Chinese companies in order to gain access 
to the Chinese market.49 
                                                                                                                            
41 See Lo, supra note 34. 
42 See id. 
43 See Amy Qin, China Exports High-Speed Rail Technology to Turkey, N.Y. TIMES (July 
28, 2014, 7:14 AM), http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/07/28/china-exports-
high-speed-rail-technology-to-turkey/ [https://perma.cc/3BDM-DJQ9]; Lo, supra note 
34. 
44 See Lo, supra note 34. 
45 See Raheja, supra note 38. 
46 See Lo, supra note 34. 
47 See Raheja, supra note 38. 
48 See id. 
49 See id. 
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II. THE CURRENT REGIME OF PROHIBITION ON GRANT-
BACK CLAUSES50 
A. Legislation and Regulations 
China’s grant-back regime is scattered throughout several au-
thorities, including the 2002 Technology Regulations,51 Contract 
Law of the PRC (“Contract Law”),52 Provisions on the Prohibition 
of the Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights to Eliminate or Re-
strict Competition (“IP Rights Guidelines”),53 and the National 
Medium- and Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and 
Technology (“MLP”).54 
1. The PRC Regulations on the Administration of the Import 
and Export of Technologies 
The Ministry of Commerce’s55 (“MOFCOM”) predecessor, 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, prom-
ulgated the 2002 Technology Regulations.56 The 2002 Technology 
Regulations apply specifically to technology imports into and ex-
                                                                                                                            
50 Chinese courts have not issued any judicial decisions related to China’s mandatory 
grant-back regime, limiting this paper’s discussion to the statutory language. Section 
III.A.2 discusses antitrust decisions on licensing practices. 
51 2002 Technology Regulations, supra note 12. 
52 See Zhongguo Renmin Gong he Guo Hetongfa (中华人民共和国合同法) [Contract Law 
of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 
1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999) [hereinafter Contract Law]. 
53 See State Council of the People's Republic of China, The National Medium- and 
Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006–2020) (Feb. 
2006), http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-02/09/content_183787.htm [https://perma.cc/
A99K-AWB2], translated at U. Sydney, http://sydney.edu.au/global-health/inter
national-networks/National_Outline_for_Medium_and_Long_Term_ST_Develop
ment1.doc [https://perma.cc/QUH3-KXC6] [hereinafter IP Rights Guidelines]. 
54 See The National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology 
Development (2006–2020), ST. COUNCIL PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC CHINA (Feb. 2006), 
http://sydney.edu.au/global-health/international-networks/National_Outline_for_
Medium_and_Long_Term_ST_Development1.doc [https://perma.cc/QUH3-KXC6] 
[hereinafter MLP for Science and Technology Development]. 
55 The Ministry of Commerce is an executive agency of the State Council of China that 
regulates foreign trade and investment. See Dingding Tina Wang, Note, When Antitrust 
Met WTO: Why U.S. Courts Should Consider U.S.–China WTO Disputes in Deciding 
Antitrust Cases Involving Chinese Exports, 122 COLUM. L. REV. 1096, 1113 (2012). 
56 2002 Technology Regulations, supra note 12. 
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ports out of China.57 A technology import occurs, for example, 
when a foreign company that owns technology registers a patent for 
the same technology in China.58 
Article 27 of the 2002 Technology Regulations provides: “Dur-
ing the valid term of a technology import contract, the fruits of im-
provements to the technology shall belong to the party making the 
improvements.”59 This language is often referred to as the “prohi-
bition on grant-back clauses” because the provision mandates that 
improvements belong to the party making the improvements, with-
out exception.60 The prohibition on grant-back clauses only applies 
to technology import contracts, and not to technology export con-
tracts,61 which is notable since China is currently a predominantly 
technology import economy.62 
2. The PRC Contract Law and the Judicial Interpretation 
Article 345 of the Contract Law, promulgated in 1999, provides 
that the transferor of a patent licensing contract shall, according to 
the terms of the contract, permit the transferee to exploit the pa-
tent.63 Under the Contract Law, in the absence of a grant-back 
clause in a contract, if the intent of the parties cannot be deter-
mined by other conduct, the improvement belongs to neither the 
licensee nor the licensor.64 This prohibition on grant-back clauses 
conflicts with the prohibition on grant-back clauses under the 2002 
Technology Regulations.65 
The Contract Law is a law of general application, but specifical-
ly provides for technology transfer contracts.66 Still, the 2002 
Technology Regulations, which were enacted three years after the 
                                                                                                                            
57 Id. at art. 2. 
58 See id. 
59 See id. at art. 27 (emphasis added). 
60 See id. 
61 See id. at art. 2. 
62 See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 26; see also discussion 
supra Section I.A.4 on China’s recent initiatives intended to transform from a technology 
import economy to export economy. 
63 See Contract Law, supra note 52, at art. 354. 
64 See id. at art. 354. 
65 Compare Contract Law, supra note 52, at art. 354, with 2002 Technology 
Regulations, supra note 12, at art. 27. 
66 See Contract Law, supra note 52, at art. 3. 
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Contract Law, are specifically-tailored to technology transfer 
agreements involving imported technology.67 The 2002 Technolo-
gy Regulations—which prohibit grant-back clauses—are control-
ling.68 
Article 329 of the Contract Law provides that technology con-
tracts are invalid if they illegally monopolize, impede technological 
progress, or infringe on technologies of others.69 To interpret Ar-
ticle 329, the Supreme People’s Court issued the Supreme 
People’s Court’s Interpretation of Several Issues on Applying Law 
to Trial of Cases of Technology Contract Dispute (“Judicial Inter-
pretation”) on December 16, 2004.70 Article 10 of the Judicial In-
terpretation enumerates circumstances that render contract provi-
sions invalid for “illegally monopolizing technology and impairing 
technological progress” pursuant to Article 329 of the Contract 
Law.71 This Judicial Interpretation provides that contract provi-
sions are invalid if they restrict a party from using improved tech-
nologies, require one party to “gratuitously” provide the other par-
ty with the improved technology, or to transfer the improved tech-
nology to the other party non-reciprocally.72 Although never ad-
dressed directly, Article 329 of the Contract Law—in light of Ar-
ticle of 10 of the Judicial Interpretation—appears to make grant-
back clauses a per se violation, which aligns with the 2002 Tech-
nology Regulations. 
The Supreme People’s Court applied Article 329 in Xiamen 
Dayang Handiwork Co. v. Xiamen Huanghe Technology and Trading 
                                                                                                                            
67 See 2002 Technology Regulations, supra note 12. 
68 See Contract Law, supra note 52, at art. 355 (stating that, where other, relevant laws 
or regulations differ with respect to technology import or export contracts or patent 
contracts, those provisions prevail); see also Chow, supra note 1, at 519 (stating that the 
chronological order of the promulgation of the two laws and the 2002 Technology 
Regulations’ higher degree of specificity suggests that Article 27 of the 2002 Technology 
Regulations is likely the controlling law on the issue). 
69 See Contract Law, supra note 52, at art. 329. 
70 See Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court Concerning Some Issues on 
Application of Law for the Trial of Cases on Disputes over Technology Contracts 
(promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 16, 2004), CLI.2.38107(EN) (Lawinfochina), art 
10. 
71 See id. 
72 See id. 
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Co..73 In Xiamen Dayang Handiwork, the licensor required the li-
censee to purchase the licensor’s equipment, even though it was 
seemingly unrelated to the licensed technology.74 This provision is 
analogous to a grant-back clause in that both mandate actions by 
the licensee for the benefit of the licensor. Admittedly, a grant-back 
clause may impact both parties in a more profound way because it 
concerns the permanent ownership of technology. The court 
upheld the contractual provision in Xiamen Dayang Handiwork, 
finding that the licensor may require this kind of additional pur-
chase for special equipment, and such a stipulation is not “contra-
dictory to the provisions of any law or regulation.”75 
It is unclear whether Article 329 encourages the transfer of 
leading technologies and therefore serves China’s needs. No eco-
nomic data exists to demonstrate Article 329’s effect on licensing. 
3. The IP Abuse Guideline Rules of China’s State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce 
Anti-Monopoly Law (“AML”) applies to all monopolistic 
practices within China and monopolistic practices occurring out-
side of China’s territory that impinges on economic competition 
within China.76 On April 7, 2015, China’s State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”)77 released its long-awaited IP 
Rights Guidelines to implement the AML against abuse of IP 
rights.78 The promulgation of these IP Rights Guidelines is China’s 
first attempt to address the abuse of IP rights under the AML,79 
                                                                                                                            
73 See Xiamen Dayang Handiwork Co. v. Xiamen Huanghe Tech. & Trading Co. 
(大洋公司诉黄河公司专利实施许可合同纠纷案) [Dayang Company v. Huanghe 
Company], 2004 SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. 9 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2004) (China). 
74 See id. 
75 Id. 
76 Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Fan Iongduan Fa (中华人民共和国反垄) [Anti-
Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), art. 2 (China). 
77 SAIC is responsible for “registration of enterprises (including foreign-invested 
enterprises) . . . [and] entities or individuals engaged in business operation . . . .” Mission, 
ST. ADMIN. INDUS. & COM. PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC CHINA, http://www.saic.gov.cn/english/
aboutus/Mission/index.html [http://perma.cc/7XFB-YDZ2] (last visited Oct. 31, 2015). 
78 IP Rights Guidelines, supra note 53. 
79 See MICHAEL GU, ANJIE LAW FIRM, BRIEF COMMENTS ON CHINA’S FIRST ANTI-
MONOPOLY REGULATION IN THE IP FIELD, http://en.anjielaw.com/downloadRepository/
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and signals the SAIC’s intent to ramp up enforcement in IP licens-
ing.80 
Article 10 of the IP Rights Guidelines specifically prohibits cer-
tain unreasonable restrictive trading conditions that may constitute 
an abuse, with exclusive grant-back clauses by companies with do-
minant market positions amongst the prohibited conditions.81 
Therefore, absent a justifiable reason, grant-back clauses by com-
panies with dominant market positions per se violate the AML, ir-
respective of proof of their anti-competitive or pro-competitive ef-
fects. The reference to “justifiable reason” might suggest that the 
SAIC will review the abuse of grant-back clauses based on an analy-
sis similar to rule of reason, which assesses the anti-competitive or 
pro-competitive effects.82 However, it remains unknown how 
much the SAIC will rely on the rule of reason analysis.83 Further, 
since such a per se prohibition only governs licensors that occupy 
dominant market positions, Article 10 is less sweeping than the 
2002 Technology Regulations and possibly the Contract Law. 
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce believes that the IP Rights 
Guidelines curtail patent owners’ interests and that patent owners, 
in practice, are often foreign companies.84 When it submitted 
comments on the eighth draft of the IP Rights Guidelines, the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce criticized that the IP Rights Guidelines 
“provide Chinese courts and SAIC with great discretion to inter-
vene in patent licensing negotiations purely based on commercial 
                                                                                                                            
6df0e385-4dcb-45ee-945f-4a5c4388482c.pdf [https://perma.cc/YE8W-XNEN] (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2016). 
80 See MICHAEL HAN & RICHARD BIRD, FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, CHINA’S 
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WITH REGARD TO IPR (June 2013), http://www.freshfields.com/uploadedFiles/Site
Wide/Knowledge/June%202013_China_s%20SAIC%20consults%20on%20draft%20Rules
%20on%20the%20enforcement%20of%20the%20Anti-Monopoly%20Law%20with%20
rega.PDF [http://perma.cc/A6BJ-FFGP]. 
81 See IP Rights Guidelines, supra note 53, at art. 10. 
82 See COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, CHINA ISSUES FINAL IP/ANTITRUST RULES (Apr. 
21, 2015), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2015/04/china_
issues_final_ip_antitrust_rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/XDL2-5HJ9]. 
83 See id. 
84 See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, COMPETING INTERESTS IN CHINA’S 
COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT: CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW APPLICATION AND 
THE ROLE OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY 70 (Sept. 9, 2014), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/
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considerations between the parties, and tilt the balance in favor of 
the Chinese licensees . . . at the expense of the patent holder.”85 
The final edition—the IP Rights Guidelines—“shows little change 
from previous drafts.”86 
B. The National Medium- and Long-Term Plan for the Development 
of Science and Technology (2006–2020) 
In February 2006, the State Council unveiled a landmark doc-
ument—the MLP.87 The MLP envisions that China will establish a 
full-fledged major research and development infrastructure system 
by 2030.88 The MLP explicitly states that a key tool for China to 
create its own IP will be through tweaking foreign technology, and 
refers to indigenous innovation as “enhancing original innovation” 
through co-innovation and re-innovation “based on the assimila-
tion . . . of imported technologies.”89 However, the legal definitions 
of “co-innovation” and “re-innovation” remain unclear.90 Not 
only does the MLP encourage co-innovation and re-innovation, it 
“also warns against blindly importing foreign technology without 
plans to transform it into Chinese technology.”91 The MLP states, 
“[O]ne should be clearly aware that importation of technology 
without emphasizing the assimilation, absorption, and re-
innovation is bound to weaken the nation’s indigenous [research 
and development] capacity.”92 President Hu referred to the ap-
proach as “innovation with Chinese characteristics.”93 Although 
                                                                                                                            
85 Id. 
86  SAIC Releases Rules on Anti-Monopoly IP Abuse Prohibitions, U.S. INFO. TECH. OFF., 
http://www.usito.org/news/saic-releases-rules-anti-monopoly-ip-abuse-prohibitions 
[https://perma.cc/3E5R-MYWY] (last visited Apr. 18, 2016). 
87 MLP for Science and Technology Development, supra note 54. 
88 See National Medium- and Long-Term Plan for Major R&D Infrastructure Issued, 
CHINA SCI. & TECH. NEWSL. (2013), http://houston.china-consulate.org/eng/st/t1035
062.htm [https://perma.cc/Y7WA-Q3A5]. 
89 JAMES MCGREGOR, GLOBAL INTELL. PROP. CTR., CHINA’S DRIVE FOR “INDIGENOUS 
INNOVATION”: A WEB OF INDUSTRIAL POLICIES (July 27, 2010), https://www.uschamber
.com/sites/default/files/legacy/reports/100728chinareport_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3J
RR-7CRF] at 4 (emphasis added) (quoting MLP for Science and Technology Development, 
supra note 54, at 10). 
90 See id. at 38. 
91 See id. at 4. 
92 MLP for Science and Technology Development, supra note 54, at 11. 
93 See MCGREGOR, supra note 89, at 13. 
2016] A LONG-OVERDUE REFORM 757 
 
not specified, the legal authority of re-innovation may lie in the 
prohibition on grant-back clauses. 
This policy has allowed China to increase its market power in 
key emerging science and technology markets,94 however, the MLP 
also led to a backlash from foreign governments and companies.95 
In 2011, under mounting pressure from foreign companies, gov-
ernments, and trade lobbies, China’s State Council abolished the 
policy of “forcing” foreign companies to transfer their IP to Chi-
nese companies to bid for government contracts.96 
C. The TRIPS Agreement and China’s WTO Commitments 
There is currently no international treaty that directly ad-
dresses technology transfer, and the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”) does not regulate technology transfer.97 Although the 
WTO regulates trades in technology under the Agreement on 
Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agree-
ment”), it merely sets forth minimum standards for IP rights, leav-
ing regulation of technology transfer to individual countries.98 
The TRIPS Agreement, however, does create a legal obligation 
for developed countries to help promote and encourage “technolo-
gy transfer to least-developed country Members in order to enable 
them to create a sound and viable technological base.”99 According 
to the TRIPS Agreement, “The protection and enforcement of in-
tellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
                                                                                                                            
94 See supra Section I.B. 
95 See supra Section I.B; see also Raheja, supra note 38. 
96 See Raheja, supra note 38. 
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WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/what_we_do
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Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
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technology . . . .”100 Importantly, “developed country Members 
shall provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms and condi-
tions, technical and financial cooperation in favour of developing 
and least-developed country Members.”101 Notably, China is not 
one of the least-developed countries recognized by the WTO, and 
there is no WTO definition of “developing” countries.102 
When China joined the WTO in 2001, it committed that “the 
terms and conditions of technology transfer, particularly in the 
context of an investment, should be agreed between the parties to 
the investment without government interference.”103 The 2002 
Technology Regulations potentially raise an issue under China’s 
WTO commitments because the regulations treat foreign compa-
nies and domestic companies differently. Particularly, the 2002 
Technology Regulations only apply to technology imports where 
foreign licensors transfer technologies to Chinese licensees and do 
not apply to exports where Chinese licensors transfer technologies 
to foreign licensees.104 
III. COMPARATIVE APPROACH 
A. How It Works in Totality: Looking at Other Laws 
1. Indemnification Provision 
Article 24 (“indemnification provision”) of the 2002 Technol-
ogy Regulations provides that if the licensor’s use of the technolo-
gy, as agreed in the contract, infringes a third party’s rights and 
interests, the licensor shall bear the liability.105 It results in foreign 
                                                                                                                            
100 Id. at art. 7. 
101 Id. at art. 67 (emphasis added). 
102 See Understanding the WTO—Least-Developed Countries, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm [https://perma.cc
/X9ZT-WPQF] (last visited Oct. 31, 2015). 
103 Working Party on the Accession of China, Report of the Working Party on the Accession 
of China, ¶ II.6.48, WT/MIN(01)/3 (Nov. 10, 2001), https://www.wto.org/english/
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104 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
105 2002 Technology Regulations, supra note 12, at art. 24. 
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licensors’ non-negotiable statutory obligation to indemnify licensees 
for third-party infringement claims.106 
The indemnification provision is similar to the prohibition on 
grant-back clauses because both provisions are mandatory. Thus, a 
violation of the indemnification provision is arguably per se illegal 
under Article 329 of the Contract Law.107 However, the grant-back 
regime differs from the indemnification provision because it creates 
ownership uncertainties, thereby restricting possibilities of true 
collaboration between the parties, while the indemnification provi-
sion merely deals with price-related cost.108 
2. Antitrust Law 
a) Qualcomm 
On February 9, 2015, the National Development and Reform 
Commission (“NDRC”)109 fined Qualcomm—a U.S.-leading chip 
manufacturer—a record $975 million for abusive patent licensing 
practices.110 The NDRC found that Qualcomm abused its domi-
nant market position in three ways—excessive pricing, unfair 
terms, and bundling—practices that are prohibited by the AML.111 
Among these licensing practices, the practice that is the most akin 
to grant-back clauses is cross-licensing condition. Under its cross-
licensing condition, Qualcomm required its customers to grant 
Qualcomm their own patent licenses for free but refused to reduce 
royalties by the value of these licenses.112 
The Qualcomm case “is a milestone in the ramp-up Chinese 
antitrust law enforcement,” as it represents the highest fine to date 
                                                                                                                            
106 See Cohen, supra note 18. 
107 See Contract Law, supra note 52, at art. 329. 
108 See 2002 Technology Regulations, supra note 12, at art. 24; Contract Law, supra note 
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in China.113 Further, the Qualcomm case put the NDRC “on a par 
with other competition authorities around the world, such as the 
European Commission, for having a reputation for taking strong 
action against anticompetitive conduct by dominant companies.”114 
The NDRC also imposed non-traditional “behavioral” remedies, 
including calculating the royalty rates based on 65%—instead of 
100%—of the wholesale price.115 The NDRC believed that such be-
havioral remedies would boost Chinese mobile device manufactur-
ers by ensuring favorable licensing terms with Qualcomm.116 
On the one hand, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has criti-
cized the NDRC’s investigation as “designed to bias license nego-
tiations in favor of would-be Chinese licensees.”117 On the other 
hand, the Qualcomm case demonstrates that Chinese authorities 
consider non-Chinese defendants interests in antitrust investiga-
tions because the outcome depends on the quality of arguments 
and evidence submitted.118 More importantly, the Qualcomm case 
demonstrates that the Chinese antitrust authorities are willing to 
adopt creative remedies that foreign companies propose.119 Indeed, 
Qualcomm “only agreed to slight modifications in its royalty rates 
in China,” which “can be looked at as nothing but a win for Qual-
comm.”120 
In 2014, Qualcomm received $13.2 billion in revenue from Chi-
nese companies, constituting almost half of its $26.5 billion total 
revenue.121 Steve Mollenkopf, Qualcomm’s CEO, acknowledged 
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that the antitrust probe was a major source of uncertainty about 
Qualcomm’s future.122 
b) Huawei Technologies v. InterDigital 
InterDigital is an American company that designs and develops 
advanced technologies for wireless communications, and it owns 
patents on international wireless communications standards.123 In 
October 2013, the Guangdong High Court of China held that In-
terDigital abused its dominant market position in the licensing of 
standard essential patents (“SEPs”) for 3G wireless communica-
tions because InterDigital sought injunctive relief in the United 
States against Huawai, which is a willing licensee.124 
Qiu Yongqing, the Chief Judge of the Guangdong Higher 
People’s Court, suggested that Chinese enterprises should follow 
Huawei’s footsteps and bravely employ anti-monopoly lawsuits to 
break technology barriers and win space for development.125 How-
ever, Judge Qiu’s comment has received criticisms that Chinese 
courts pay more attention to industrial policy concerns than the 
legal merits of the case.126 
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B. International Perspectives: Grant-Back Regimes in Other 
Jurisdictions 
In most countries, technology transfer is subject to some form 
of competition law because licensing IP rights in technology trans-
fers may extend the monopoly to the licensees, thereby creating 
anticompetitive effects detrimental to the local economy.127 Below, 
the competition laws of the United States and the European Union 
are compared with that of China. 
1. The United States: Rule of Reason 
In the United States, grant-back clauses are not per se illegal 
but rather are evaluated under the “rule of reason.”128 The 1995 
Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property indi-
cate that, in applying the rule of reason, anticompetitive effects 
should be balanced against offsetting pro-competitive effects.129 
Anticompetitive effects include reducing the licensee’s incentive to 
invest in improving the licensed technology while pro-competitive 
effects include allowing the parties to share risks and compensating 
the licensor for making improvements.130 An important factor of 
the assessment is the licensor’s market power in the relevant mar-
ket.131 In practice, IP licensing practices are rigorous in the United 
States, resulting in great revenues.132 
The rule of reason would not be entirely practicable in China 
because Chinese courts do not play as prominent of a role in estab-
lishing the law as U.S. courts do. Instead of being one of the three 
equal branches of the government, Chinese courts are viewed as 
subordinate to the legislative branch and part of the Communist 
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129 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE 
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.6 (Apr. 6, 1995), http://www.justice.gov/atr/
antitrust-guidelines-licensing-intellectual-property#t57 [http://perma.cc/GK89-7WK4]. 
130 See id. 
131 See id. 
132 See supra Section III.A.2. 
2016] A LONG-OVERDUE REFORM 763 
 
Party.133 Consequently, Chinese court decisions have limited au-
thority and little precedential value.134 
Although the rule of reason does not fit into China’s legal sys-
tem perfectly, it nonetheless sheds light on how China should re-
structure its grant-back regime. China should make the rule of rea-
son the default rule for non-severable improvements.135 Since the 
rule of reason is part of antitrust law, it is less restrictive than Ar-
ticle 329 of the Contract Law.136 Regardless, the rule of reason ef-
fectively invalidates any abuse of the relaxed grant-back regime. 
2. The European Union: Severable Versus Non-Severable 
Improvements 
European Community Regulation 772/2004 distinguishes be-
tween “non-severable” improvements and “severable” improve-
ments.137 Severable improvements can be used without using the 
original licensed patent, while non-severable improvements cannot 
be used without using the original patent.138 On the one hand, E.U. 
law prohibits grant-back clauses on severable improvements, with 
licensees owning severable improvements.139 On the other hand, 
E.U. law allows grant-back clauses on non-severable improve-
ments,140 differing from China’s prohibition on grant-back clauses. 
In China, if the Chinese licensee makes a non-severable improve-
ment and subsequently obtains a patent for that improvement, once 
the licensing agreement expires, the Chinese licensee may hinder 
the foreign licensor’s ability to use the original patent in China.141 
China’s prohibition on grant-back clauses is more restrictive and 
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protective of the licensees, while E.U. law is more technical and 
precise.142 
China should adopt the E.U. model, prohibiting grant-back 
clauses on severable improvements.143 Many argue that E.U. com-
petition law is the most sophisticated in the world.144 The Euro-
pean Commission constantly studies, revises, and fine-tunes E.U. 
competition laws based on its acquired experience.145 More impor-
tantly, China has previously borrowed from E.U. competition law, 
rather than U.S. law, in creating its model modern competition 
law.146 This is in part because China has adopted a civil law system 
that is similar to the E.U. system, where statutes and regulations 
are the primary sources in establishing laws.147 
Notably, a distinction exists regarding the ultimate authority in 
interpreting laws. In China, the final authority on most issues re-
garding competition law is the powerful MOFCOM.148 In contrast, 
although the European Commission plays an important role in im-
plementing its competition laws, the ultimate implementing au-
thority lies in the Court of Justice of the European Communities, a 
high court.149 Therefore, aside from distinguishing severable and 
non-severable improvements, China should subject any abuse of 
the relaxed grant-back regime for non-severable improvements to 
the rule of reason under the AML.150 
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IV. CHINA SHOULD REFORM ITS CURRENT GRANT-BACK 
REGIME 
A. China Should Continue to Prohibit Grant-Back Clauses on 
Severable Improvements 
Since the European Union’s approach is well received and 
China has followed many E.U. models, China should adopt their 
approach in distinguishing severable and non-severable improve-
ments.151 China should not relax its grant-back regime all at once. 
As SAIC acknowledged in 2013, China was not ready for full-blown 
and tailored antitrust guidelines because China had only been en-
forcing the AML in the IP field for a brief period of time and thus 
lacked experience.152 
B. China Should Make Grant-Back Clauses on Non-Severable 
Improvements Non-Mandatory and Evaluate Potential Abuse 
Under the Rule of Reason of the Antitrust Law 
China’s current mandatory grant-back regime is too restric-
tive.153 Therefore, the default rule for non-severable improvements 
should be non-mandatory, where parties are free to decide the 
ownership of improvements. Any potential abuse of this non-
mandatory grant-back rule should be subject to antitrust law. This 
is because grant-back clauses have both pro-competitive and anti-
competitive effects.154 Grant-back clauses may be pro-competitive 
because they promote innovation and subsequent licensing by pro-
viding a means for the licensee and the licensor to share risks and 
by rewarding the licensor for making further innovation based on 
the licensed technology.155 Grant-back clauses may also be pro-
competitive if they substantially reduce the licensee’s incentives to 
engage in research and development.156 Indeed, other countries in-
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clude their grant-back regime as part of the antitrust law.157 Fur-
ther, China should adopt the United States’ rule of reason when 
assessing abuse because the United States’ high revenues from IP 
licensing prove that the rule of reason is well functional.158 
C. China Should Apply Its Grant-Back Rules to Foreign and Domestic 
Companies Equally and Fairly 
China’s grant-back regime is too protective of the recipient of 
the technology (usually a Chinese business entity), giving Chinese 
licensees unfair advantages.159 China essentially uses state coercion 
to obtain technology transfer. Particularly, the 2002 Technology 
Regulations only prohibit grant-back clauses by foreign licensors 
but not Chinese licensors, which might have compromised China’s 
WTO commitments.160 Wang Xiaoye, a Chinese legal scholar, ar-
gues that China’s technology transfer regime does not adequately 
take the licensor’s interests into account and imposes unreasonable 
restrictions on the licensor.161 
Further, foreign companies often feel pressure to cultivate rela-
tionships with enforcement authorities such as MOFCOM be-
cause, in practice, MOFCOM is the final authority with a broad 
discretion on technology transfer issues.162 Cultivating relation-
ships, while necessary, brings additional risks as China has a cul-
ture of corruption.163 In fact, China’s antitrust law has already 
raised concerns at the highest levels of the U.S. government. In 
December 2014, President Obama raised concerns directly to Pres-
ident Xi.164 White House National Security Council spokesman 
Patrick Ventrell explained, “The United States government is con-
cerned that China is using numerous mechanisms, including anti-
                                                                                                                            
157 See supra Section III.B. 
158 See supra Section III.B.1. 
159 See supra Section IV.B. 
160 See supra Sections II.B–C. 
161 See XIAOYE WANG, THE EVOLUTION OF CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW § 3.2, at 227 
(2014). 
162 See Chow, supra note 1, at 528. 
163 Id. 
164 See Michael Martina & Matthew Miller, As Qualcomm Decision Looms, U.S. Presses 
China on Antitrust Policy, REUTERS (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2014/12/16/us-qualcomm-china-antitrust-idUSKBN0JU0AK20141216 
[http://perma.cc/BQZ3-LSZK]. 
2016] A LONG-OVERDUE REFORM 767 
 
monopoly law, to lower the value of foreign-owned patents and 
benefit Chinese firms employing foreign technology.”165 
China’s unequal treatment to Chinese and foreign companies 
has compromised China’s reputation. As a result, Chinese compa-
nies encountered difficulties when entering foreign markets. For 
example, in 2004, when Lenovo (a Chinese company) proposed to 
purchase IBM’s personal computer division, the U.S. Congress 
strongly opposed the transaction.166 Hostility against Chinese com-
panies re-emerged in 2005 when COMCC (another Chinese com-
pany) attempted to acquire Unocal (a U.S. petroleum firm).167 
Confronted with strong reactions by U.S. politicians, this transac-
tion was not consummated.168 As a result, many Chinese compa-
nies criticized the United States for denying Chinese companies’ 
fair access to the United States market for fear of competition.169 
D. China Should Reform Its Grant-Back Regime Now Rather Than 
Later 
In the past, China justified its prohibition on grant-back clauses 
by characterizing itself as a developing country.170 China’s highly 
restrictive grant-back provision has become a remnant of a bygone 
era during which time China did not trust foreign companies.171 As 
recently as two decades ago, China was a developing country just 
starting on the path of industrialization. China was afraid that craf-
ty and experienced business-minded foreign companies would ex-
ploit inexperienced Chinese businesses.172 This attitude may have 
led to such a sweeping prohibition on grant-back clauses that re-
quires an absolute warranty from foreign licensors. 
Today, however, this distrust in foreign companies is outdated. 
As the world’s second largest economy, China has many sophisti-
cated businesspersons who are experienced in dealing with foreign 
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companies.173 China has made impressive progress in technology 
intensive and high-end manufacturing through technology trans-
fer.174 Although the grant-back regime may have previously helped 
Chinese companies gain market power as importers, it now hurts 
China’s reputation in international trades,175 thereby limiting Chi-
na’s potential for technology export in the future. 
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